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Attentional biases toward threats (ABTs) have been described in high anxious individuals
and in clinical samples whereas they have been rarely reported in non-clinical samples
(Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cisler and Koster, 2010). Three kinds of ABTs have been identiﬁed
(facilitation, difﬁculty of disengagement, and avoidance) but their mechanisms and time
courses are still unclear. This study aimed to understand ABTs mechanisms and timing
in low trait anxiety (LTA) and high trait anxiety (HTA) anxious individuals. In particular,
in an exogenous cueing task we used threatening or neutral stimuli as peripheral cues
with three presentation times (100, 200, or 500 ms). The main results showed that HTA
individuals have an attentional facilitation bias at 100ms (likely automatic in nature) whereas
LTA individuals show attentional avoidance and difﬁculty to disengage from threatening
stimuli at 200 ms (likely related to a strategic processing). Such ﬁndings demonstrate that
threat biases attention with speciﬁc mechanisms and time courses, and that anxiety levels
modulate attention allocation.
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INTRODUCTION
Different kinds of attentional biases toward threats (ABTs) have
been described in high anxious individuals and in clinical samples,
whereas they have been rarely reported in low anxiety individ-
uals (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cisler and Koster, 2010). Indeed,
when faced with fearful stimuli, high anxious individuals tend
to detect them quickly (facilitation bias), at 100 and 200 ms
of stimulus presentation times (PTs; Koster et al., 2006, 2007;
Massar et al., 2011), and to remain anchored upon them (dif-
ﬁculty of disengagement), between 100 and 500 ms (Fox et al.,
2001; Koster et al., 2004b, 2006; Massar et al., 2011), whereas non-
anxious individuals seem to avoid the same stimuli (avoidance
bias), after ∼200 ms (Koster et al., 2006, 2007). The disengage-
ment bias toward threat has been observed in both high state
anxiety individuals at rapid PTs (Fox et al., 2001) and high trait
anxiety individuals at a slower PT (Fox, 2002). Moreover, Koster
et al. (2006) showed that, after an early facilitation bias, high
anxious individuals show a subsequent tendency to shift their
attention away from threatening stimuli (avoidance bias). There-
fore, the facilitation and the disengagement biases have been
found in high trait anxiety individuals only, whereas the avoid-
ance bias has been reported in both high and low trait anxious
individuals.
Mathews (1990) proposed that the ABTs play an important
role in maintaining high anxiety levels, as anxious individuals
wouldbemore likely todetect potential threats in the environment,
which would increase their anxiety levels. However, different, and
often contrasting, hypotheses have been subsequently put for-
ward to explain ABTs (for a review, see Cisler and Koster, 2010).
For instance, Williams et al. (1997) suggested that high and low
anxious individuals differ in their attention allocationmechanisms
in presence of threatening stimuli: high anxiety individuals direct
attention toward threat while low anxiety individuals direct atten-
tion away from threat. Similarly, Eysenck et al. (2007) proposed
that high anxious individuals show an impairment in attentional
control, enhancing vigilance for threatening stimuli and inducing
difﬁculties in disengaging attention from threat. According to a
different point of view, the so-called vigilance–avoidance hypoth-
esis of ABTs (Mogg et al., 2004), high anxious individuals tend to
overestimate the stimuli’s threat value, and show an enhancement
of automaticmechanisms detecting potential threats, but also tend
to avoid further processing of stimuli closely matching their own
phobic concerns.
More recently, Cisler and Koster (2010) proposed that, in
high anxious individuals and in clinical samples, the three biases
(facilitation, difﬁculty in disengagement, and avoidance) differ as
regards: (i) type of processing (automatic or strategic), (ii) cog-
nitive mechanisms (attentional control and emotion regulation
goals), and (iii) neural bases (amygdala and prefrontal circuits).
In detail, Cisler and Koster (2010) suggested that the automatic
processing of attention, mediated by the amygdala, is responsible
for detecting threatening stimuli and rapidly orienting attention
toward them (facilitation bias). Strategic or conscious elabora-
tion (mediated by the frontal cortex network) would be instead
responsible for biased attention distribution (favoring alloca-
tion of attention on neutral stimuli: avoidance), and strategic
attentional control (determining difﬁculties in disengagement).
The model nicely explains ﬁndings (Koster et al., 2006) show-
ing that high anxious (but not low anxious) individuals show
different ABTs in response to aversive stimuli as a function of
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PTs: in particular, facilitation bias and difﬁculty in disengage-
ment with short PTs, and an avoidance bias with longer PTs.
The time course of ABTs has been conﬁrmed by Massar et al.
(2011), who found an early attentional engagement for threaten-
ing stimuli in high anxious individuals; however, the authors also
found a slower disengagement from threat cues in all participants,
irrespective of their trait anxiety levels, in contrast with Koster
et al.’s (2006) observations about the lack of ABTs in low anxious
individuals. Therefore, Massar et al.’s (2011) ﬁndings would be
compatible with the idea that the Cisler and Koster’s (2010) model
would also apply to non-anxious people, at least for threatening
stimuli.
The idea that the same model can be applied to people with
low and high anxiety is not consistent with recent data show-
ing a differential modulation of hypervigilance (facilitation bias)
and avoidance in high and low trait anxious individuals. Actu-
ally, using a conditioning procedure, Onnis et al. (2011) reported
that high anxious participants showed an attentional facilita-
tion when stimuli were presented for 200 ms and an attentional
avoidance when stimuli were presented for 500 ms, whereas low
anxious individuals showed an opposite attentional pattern, with
an early tendency to divert attention from aversive stimuli (200ms
presentation) and a later orientation toward them (500ms presen-
tation). These data would conﬁrm that facilitation and avoidance
are characterized by distinct attentional mechanisms operating at
different stages of information processing, but also would sug-
gest that activation of such mechanisms is dependent on anxiety
levels.
On the basis of the studies reviewed above, two questions are
still open. First, Cisler and Koster’s (2010) hypothesis, according
to which the facilitation bias is related to an early automatic pro-
cessing whereas avoidance and disengagement biases are driven
by later strategic elaboration, has not been directly tested in a
study tapping all the threeABTs in a comprehensivewithin-subject
paradigm. Second, it is not clear whether the same cognitive
mechanisms can account for ABTs in low and high trait anxious
individuals.
The present study aimed to tackle these issues by an experi-
mental paradigm combining within- and between-subjects obser-
vation, in which threatening or neutral stimuli modulated explicit
allocation of spatial attention. By using three PTs we could
systematically explore: (i) whether facilitation, difﬁculty of dis-
engagement and avoidance are speciﬁcally related to early or late
time windows, as foreseen by Cisler and Koster’s (2010) model,
within the same subjects, and (ii) whether the same pattern of
ABTs can be observed in two groups of individuals with low or
high trait anxiety, consistent with possible generalization of the
model, independently from anxiety levels.
According to the original formulation of Cisler and Koster’s
(2010) model we could expect to ﬁnd a facilitation bias at
the shortest PTs, and difﬁculty of disengagement and avoid-
ance bias at the longest PT in high anxious individuals, and no
bias in low anxious participants. However, the present study
would also make possible to ﬁnd the same ABTs, with the
same time course, in low anxious individuals too, thus suggest-
ing that Cisler and Koster’s (2010) model can apply irrespective
of anxiety level, and can be considered as a general model of
emotion-related modulation of attentional resources, reﬂecting
adaptive (or maladaptive) response mechanisms. It is also possi-
ble to ﬁnd partial discrepancies between high and low anxious
individuals, compatible with the idea that high anxiety levels
can affect deployment of attentional resources over environmen-
tal features, whereas the low anxious pattern of ABTs might




Participants were 95 non-clinical female undergraduate students
from the Second University of Naples, dwelling in South Italy
(age range = 20–33 years, mean age = 23.85, SE = 3.2). As in
previous studies on ABTs (e.g., Leyman et al., 2009; De Raedt
et al., 2010), only female participants were included in the study to
ensuremaximumhomogeneity of the sample, and becausewomen
are considered to show greater facility in decoding non-verbal
messages and to rate their emotions more intensely than males
(Killgore and Yurgelun-Todd, 2001).
The participants were assigned to one of two groups according
to their anxiety scores on the Trait subscale of State-Trait Anxi-
ety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1983): following previous
studies (Onnis et al., 2011), participantswith STAI-Trait score<35
were included in the LTA group, and participants with a STAI-T
score > 49 were included in the HTA group; individuals with
intermediate scores (35–49) were excluded from the study. All
subjects were right-handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision, and were naive to purposes and predictions of the exper-
iment. Participants gave their written informed consent to take
part in the experiment on a voluntary basis, without receiving any
reward.
PROCEDURE
Participants completed state and trait versions of the STAI-Y and,
then, were asked to perform amodiﬁed version of the Posner Task.
MATERIALS
State-Trait Anxiety Scale
The STAI-Y (Spielberger et al., 1983) consists of two 20-item scales
aiming at measuring state and trait anxiety. The STAI-State sub-
scale requires respondents to rate how they feel “right now. . . at
this moment” using a 4-point scale (1 = not at all, 4 = very
much so) in response to a series of self-descriptive statements.
The STAI-Trait subscale, used here to allocate subjects to LTA or
HTA groups, asks respondents to rate how they “generally” feel
using a 4-point scale (1 = almost never, 4 = almost always) in
response to a series of self-descriptive statements. These subscales
have been demonstrated to be valid and to have solid psychometric
properties (Spielberger et al., 1983).
Exogenous cueing task
Participants were presented with a dot detection task driven by an
exogenous (threatening or neutral) spatial cue; this paradigm is
a modiﬁed version of the Posner (1980). Each trial began with a
ﬁxation cross (+) ﬂanked by two blank squares (340 × 340 pixel)
on its right and left side. After 750 ms, a cue (a threatening or
non-threatening image; 300 × 300 pixel) appeared in one of the
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two square for 100, 200, or 500 ms in randomized order, fol-
lowed by a dot (1 cm) presented in one of the two squares, in
the same (valid trial) or in the opposite (invalid trial) position as
the cue.
Images used as cues were selected from a larger sample 150
images consisting of familiar scenes of animals, people or natural
events in order to maximize ecological validity. In a preliminary
phase, images were shown, one at a time, on a pc monitor to 30
undergraduate students (age range: 20–30), who were asked to
judge threat degree of each stimulus on a scale from 0 (not threat-
ening) to 4 (very threatening) by pressing a corresponding key on
the pc keyboard. For the present experiment we used the 20 images
judged as most threatening (mean score of threat degree = 2.9;
range = 2.5–4), and the 20 images judged as least threatening
(mean score of threat degree = 0.7; range = 0–1). Each stimulus
appeared at least once in right and left squares.
Valid (n = 192, 80%; 96 threatening and 96 non-threatening)
and invalid (n = 48, 20%; 24 threatening and 24 non-threatening)
trials were presented in a randomized order for a total of 240 trials
(Figure 1).
Participants were required to respond, as fast and accurately as
possible, pressing a right key (m) on the keyboard when the target
(dot) appeared on the right and a left key (z) when the target
appears on the left. Both accuracy and response times (RTs) were
recorded.
DATA ANALYSIS
A preliminary multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA)
with anxiety group (LTA, HTA) as the independent factor was
conducted on age and anxiety levels, to characterize the two
samples.
After removing outliers (RT<150 and >1000; Koster et al.,
2004a), raw RTs for correct trials were analyzed by a mixed anal-
ysis of variance (ANOVA) 2X2X2X3 with one between-subject
factor (anxiety group: LTA, HTA) and three within-subject fac-
tors (valence: threatening, non-threatening; validity: valid, invalid;
PTs: 100, 200, 500 ms).
Planned contrasts with Bonferroni correction were used to
compare RTs for threatening vs. non-threatening stimuli.
As suggested by Koster et al. (2006), for the analysis of single
ABTswe calculated the facilitation score (RTvalid/non-threatening
cue – RTvalid/threatening cue) and the disengagement score
(RTinvalid/threatening cue – RTinvalid/non-threatening cue). A
positive facilitation score indicates an early enhanced attentional
capture by threatening cues compared with non-threatening cues
(facilitation bias). A positive value on disengagement score indi-
cates stronger attentional holding by threatening cues compared
with non-threatening ones (disengagement bias). Negative values
of both scores indicate a tendency to avoid threatening stimuli
(avoidance bias). A value not different from zero at either score
means lack of ABTs (i.e., no difference in processing of threatening
vs. non-threatening cues).
A MANOVA with anxiety group (LTA, HTA) as indepen-
dent factor was conducted on bias scores. Univariate analyses
and planned comparisons with Bonferroni correction were then
executed.
Single-sample t-test comparisons were used to evidence
whether bias scores were signiﬁcantly different from zero.
FIGURE 1 | Schematic overview of valid (first row) and invalid trials (middle row). Examples of non-treatening (left) or threatening (right) stimuli are
depicted in the bottom row.
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RESULTS
GROUP CHARACTERISTICS
On the basis of the results of the Trait subscale of the STAI, 27
participants were included in the LTA group and 28 in the HTA
group, whereas 40 subjects were excluded from the study.
The MANOVA with trait anxiety group as the independent
factor, and age, state and trait anxiety scores as outcome vari-
ables conﬁrmed that theHTAgrouphad signiﬁcantly higher scores
compared to the LTA group both in trait anxiety [HTA = 59.18;
LTA = 31.30; F(1,53) = 325.92, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.86] and
in state anxiety [HTA = 46.68; LTA = 31.11; F(1,53) = 40.06,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.43], whereas the two groups did not differ in age
[HTA = 22.64; LTA = 23.26; F(1,53) = 0.69, p = 0.40, η2p = 0.01].
DOT DETECTION TASK
Means and standard deviations for correct RTs are reported in
Table 1.
The ANOVA on RTs showed that all within-subject main
effects were signiﬁcant. In particular, the effect of Validity
[F(1,53) = 293.98, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.85] was related to
faster responses for valid (M = 323.13) than for invalid trials
(M = 382.18; p < 0.001); the effect of Valence [F(1,53) = 5.13,
p = 0.03, η2p = 0.09] was due to faster responses for
non-threatening (M = 350.95) than for threatening stimuli
(M = 354.36; p = 0.03); last, the effect of PT [F(2,106) = 83.42,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.61] was related to faster responses for longer
PTs (100 ms = 370.40; 200 ms = 351.97; 500 ms = 335.59;
all different from each other at p < 0.001). The main effect
of Group was not signiﬁcant [F(1,53) = 0.78, p = 0.38,
η2p = 0.01].
We also observed two signiﬁcant interactions: Validity × PT
interaction [F(2,106) = 8.91, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.14], and
Valence × PT × Validity interaction [F(2,106) = 3.85, p = 0.02,
η2p = 0.07], whereas all other interactions were not signiﬁcant.
Planned comparison on the Valence × PT × Validity interaction
revealed signiﬁcant shorter RTs for non-threatening (M = 378.80)
compared to threatening stimuli (M = 390.06) only for invalid
trials at 200 ms. No other signiﬁcant difference emerged.
The MANOVA on bias scores showed a signiﬁcant effect of
Group factor on attentional facilitation at 200 ms [F(1,53) = 4.75,
p = 0.03, η2p = 0.08], as HTA individuals showed a positive facil-
itation bias (M = 1.88; SE = 3.45) and LTA showed a negative
facilitation bias (M = −8.84; SE = 3.51).
Furthermore, one-sample t-tests on bias scores, in comparison
to zero (Koster et al., 2006), revealed that LTA (Figure 2) showed
attentional disengagement bias [t(26)= 2.38, p= 0.02] and avoid-
ance [t(26) = −2.27, p = 0.03] at 200 ms; instead, HTA showed
a signiﬁcant facilitation bias at 100 ms [t(27) = 2.06, p = 0.049],
whereas the difﬁculty in disengagement at 100 ms fell short of the
signiﬁcance level [t(27) = 1.97, p = 0.059].
DISCUSSION
Our study investigating ABTs in both low and high trait anxiety
individuals, identiﬁed a signiﬁcant facilitation bias at the shortest
PT (100 ms) in HTA individuals, in line with previous studies
(Koster et al., 2006, 2007). This bias is compatible with the idea
that an automatic processing system is responsible for detecting
Table 1 | Mean and SE of the RTs in the Modified PosnerTask as a function of anxiety group, validity, valence, and PT.
LTA HTA
PT Validity Valence Mean SE Mean SE
100 Invalid Threatening 402.59 13.37 394.44 13.13
Non-threatening 401.63 12.75 380.79 12.52
Valid Threatening 354.45 11.53 334.52 11.32
Non-threatening 354.69 11.62 340.12 11.41
200 Invalid Threatening 395.60 12.58 384.54 12.35
Non-threatening 378.81 13.50 378.78 13.26
Valid Threatening 332.88 11.76 309.64 11.54
Non-threatening 324.04 11.07 311.52 10.87
500 Invalid Threatening 373.15 12.67 357.73 12.44
Non-threatening 373.17 12.64 364.94 12.41
Valid Threatening 313.83 10.87 299.00 10.67
Non-threatening 309.84 9.97 293.04 9.79
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FIGURE 2 | Mean (and standard error) of Bias Score as a function of anxiety in LTA and HTA groups. Asterisks indicate signiﬁcant differences between
ABT and zero (*p < 0.05).
and orienting attention toward threat (Mathews and Mackintosh,
1998; Mogg and Bradley, 1998; Cisler and Koster, 2010).
The lack of attentional bias in HTA individuals at longer PTs
(200 and 500 ms) is not consistent with ﬁndings reported by
Koster et al. (2006) in HTA, and by Koster et al. (2007) in nor-
mal individuals with intermediate levels of trait anxiety. It should
be remembered that ABTs at 200 ms PT have also been reported
in spider-fearful individuals with high fear (Mogg and Bradley,
2006), when presented with fear congruent stimuli. It is impor-
tant to underline that the discrepancies between the present results
and those reported by Koster et al. (2006, 2007) and by Mogg and
Bradley (2006) might be ascribed to the different characteristics
of the stimuli employed in the experimental paradigms. In their
studies Koster et al. (2006, 2007) used the International Affective
Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al., 2005) scenes and intensive, high
threat stimuli, as the authors themselves underlined (for instance,
“mutilated face” with strong negative valence and high arousal
value), whereas Mogg and Bradley (2006) used stimuli (spiders)
with strong negative valence and high arousal value for the spe-
ciﬁc sample they assessed. Here, we employed familiar stimuli
(such as animals, everyday scenes, and common objects), without
selecting high intensity threatening items as in previous stud-
ies. It is therefore entirely plausible that the stimuli used in the
present study were less liable to produce avoidance and disen-
gagement biases in high anxious individuals. In fact, according
to the dual competition framework (Pessoa, 2009), threat-related
stimuli carry affective signiﬁcance, which alters performance by
strengthening sensory representations at the perceptual level and
by prioritizing attention at the executive level. Although threat
consistently leads to prioritize perceptual processing, its effect on
executive control dramatically depends on the level of threat: high
threat stimuli would enhance processing of the threat (hard pri-
oritization), while low threat stimuli would determine a slight
improvement of threat processing (soft prioritization). In line
with this framework (Pessoa, 2009), the threat intensity of the
stimuli used in the present study might have interacted with anx-
iety levels, determining a different prioritization in the HTA and
LTA groups.
The main ﬁnding of the present study was indeed the diver-
gence between the pattern of ABTs found in HTA and in LTA
groups. A difference between high and low anxious individuals in
attentional allocation mechanisms has been already hypothesized
by Williams et al. (1997), who suggested that high anxiety would
be characterized by a facilitation bias, whereas low anxiety indi-
viduals would be particularly characterized by avoidance bias. As
recalled above, our experimental paradigm allowed us to detect
only a signiﬁcant facilitation bias in HTA individuals, whereas we
found both difﬁculty in disengagement and attentional avoidance
in the LTA group. Several previous studies on low anxiety indi-
viduals did report threat-related attentional biases (Mogg et al.,
1994;Yiend andMathews,2001;Massar et al., 2011),whereas other
studies only detected attentional avoidance (MacLeod and Math-
ews, 1988) or difﬁculty in disengagement (Massar et al., 2011). To
the best of our knowledge, there is no previous evidence about
co-occurrence of both biases in LTA at a speciﬁc time window
(200 ms PT), but not at very rapid (100 ms) or longer (500 ms)
PTs.
The speciﬁc time course of difﬁculty in disengagement and
attentional avoidance, observed in LTA only, would exclude that
these ﬁndings can be ascribed to a general slowing of responding
to subsequent target stimuli caused by threat cues in exoge-
nous cueing task (Mogg et al., 2008). According to an alternative
www.frontiersin.org July 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 685 | 5
Sagliano et al. Attentional bias, threat, and anxiety
interpretation, the simultaneous presence of difﬁculty of disen-
gagement and avoidance at 200 ms in LTA would only reﬂect
a form of cognitive freezing, as suggested by Fox et al. (2001)
or non-attentional behavioral freezing, as suggested by Clarke
et al. (2013). Freezing is an early response to detected danger
throughout the animal kingdom that increase the chances of
survival in threatening situations (LeDoux, 1996), but it has
freezing-like responses have been also detected in normal human
individuals engaged in concurrent cognitive tasks (Sagliano et al.,
2014). It can be argued that the delayed responses to threat-
ening stimuli in both valid and invalid trial could reﬂect a
cognitive form of the freezing response, but it would remain to
explain the reason why only LTA showed these biases, and only at
200 ms.
The ﬁnding of a speciﬁc disengagement bias at 200 ms is
congruent with Cisler and Koster’s (2010) model, positing that
attentional facilitation is driven by automatic processing, while the
disengagement bias and the attentional avoidance reﬂect strategic
orienting of attention. In this perspective, the presence of such
biases in LTA would support the idea that Cisler and Koster’s
(2010) model is not speciﬁc for the clinical sample but it can be
applied to all individuals, independently from their anxiety level.
However, as suggested by Koster et al. (2006), HTA individuals are
characterized by an oversensitive threat appraisal system that leads
to overestimate valence of threatening stimuli. This causes a shift
of attention toward moderately threatening stimuli (facilitation
bias) in these individuals, whereas LTA individuals do not show
the same enhanced, rapid detection of threats, and are able to
strategically avoid threatening stimuli and yet to take such stimuli
under attentional control.
Disengagement biasmay serve tomaintain and enhance anxiety
states (Fox et al., 2001). In contrast, avoidance bias, i.e., the ability
to rapidly disengage from threat-related material once identiﬁed,
may be a useful mechanism to keep anxiety levels under control.
Several studies (Beck and Clark, 1997) suggested that a top-
down modiﬁcation of attention allocation would reduce the
risk of negative consequences from threat, thus resulting in an
attentional avoidance of threatening stimuli. However, it should
be underlined that LTA individuals showed at the same time
window (200 ms) both attentional avoidance and difﬁculty to
disengagement, an apparently paradoxical ﬁnding (see Cisler
and Koster, 2010). Nevertheless, on the basis of the distinc-
tion between overt and covert attentional mechanisms (Posner,
1980).Weierich et al. (2008) argued that individuals might overtly
avoid the threat and covertly maintain their attention on it. This
might represent the most effective method to deal with poten-
tial threats, without activating strong emotion-related cognitive
and neural processes. This ability to react to threat might reduce
individual vulnerability to adverse events. Recently, Min et al.
(2012) suggested that the ability to respond to stress and adver-
sity, together with LTA levels, might reduce the risk to develop
psychiatric disorder; Min et al. (2012) also suggested that eval-
uation and management of trait anxiety can enhance patient’s
resilience and improve treatment of depression and anxiety disor-
ders. Our results are substantially in line with these statements.
Indeed, the difference between high and low anxious individ-
uals revealed in this study is compatible with the idea that the
ability to simultaneously control and avoid threat showed by LTA
might be considered the most advantageous response modal-
ity, likely allowing to minimize negative emotional responses to
threats and, possibly, the risk of developing clinically relevant
anxiety.
In other words, this speciﬁc pattern of ABTs might reﬂect the
differences between HTA and LTA’s behavior, and help compre-
hending why some individuals are characterized by low levels of
anxiety.
The lack of analogous ﬁndings in LTA in previous stud-
ies might be ascribed to the speciﬁc methodological procedures
adopted here, as regards the stimuli (we used familiar items to
assess responses to plausible threats), the experimental paradigm
(we used three randomized PTs to avoid participants prepare
their responses), and the sample selection (we selected a gender-
homogeneous sample, thus minimizing variability, on the basis of
well deﬁned cut-off values for low or high trait anxiety). These
methodological choices likely contributed to put in evidence pre-
viously unreported ﬁndings in LTA, but also impose some caveats
in generalizing the present results. Future studies will have to verify
whether the samepattern is present inmale individuals, and, above
all, to take into account the possible effects of stimuli’s valence also
assessing physiological correlates of threat processing. Moreover,
future studiesmight also take into account the possible interaction
of depressive mood with ABTs, although available evidence would
suggest that depressed individuals usually showABTs at PT longer
than those used in the present study (Mogg and Bradley, 2005).
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